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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAUDE BAKER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
L. JANSEN, doing business as UTAH 
HOUSE CLEANING COMP'ANY, 
Defendant and App,ellarnt. 
APPELLANT '~S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7239 
The plaintiff brought this action against the de-
fendants S•tanley D. Decker and L. Jansen, doing busi-
ness as Utah House Cleaning Comp,any, for damages 
alleged to have resulted to her on the morning of Jan-
uary 29, 1946, from a fall while she was walking along 
the second story hallway of the Roosevelt Apartments 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Th·e case was tried before a 
jury and at •the close of plaintiff's case a motion for 
nonsuit was grante:d in favor of the defendant, Stanley 
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D. Decker. (R,. 106) After the parties had introduced 
their evidence and rested, the trial eourt denied the. 
the motion of the defendant, L. Jansen, for a direeted 
verdict, and the case was submitted to the jury. The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against 
the defendant, L. Jansen, and it is from this verdict 
and the judgment which was entered that defendant 
ap,peals. 
The Roosevelt Apartment House is a three-story 
building facing north on Third South Street in Salt 
Lake City. There is a driveway on the east side of the 
building which leads from the street to garages at the 
rear of 'the building. Each of the three floors has a 
hallway running north and south the full length of the 
building. There are three stairways in the building, 
one in front, one in back and one on the east side. These 
stairways -connect the three floors each with the other, 
thereby allowing traverse of the floor above or below 
from any stairway. Mter deseending to the main floor 
'level, the front or north stairway continues to the front 
entrance, the ·east stairway eontinues to an alleyway 
entrance, and the back or south stairway eontinues to 
'the back entrance. Mrs. Baker lived in Apartment 212, 
which is the second apartment from the south end of 
the building on th·e east side of the second floor. (R. 
90-93, Exhibit 5) 
The defendant L. Jansen, doing business as Utah 
House Cleaning Company, was engaged in the business 
of painting, papering and housecleaning. He had en-
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tered into a contract with the defendant, Stanley D. 
Decker, the ovvner of the Roosevelt Apartments, to paint 
the wood,vork, :p1aper the ceilings and walls of the halls 
and stair,vays and wash the wainscoting on the lower 
walls of said ap~artment hous-e. He began work fou.r or 
five days prior to the 29th of January and had com-
pleted the top floor and all of the second floor eX!cept 
the north part of the hallway and front stairway. (R. 
111-112) At 8:00 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, 
he and his help~er, Leonard V ermaas, set up •their equip'"" 
ment in the north p·art of the second floor hallway. ;This 
equipment consisted of a canvas drop cloth, a p~ap;ering 
table, a tool box and a ll'aste bucket. (R. 112-113) The 
canvas was twelve feet long, folded to make a three-foot 
width and placed under the table to receive the strips 
of paper after the paper had been trimm·ed. (R. 113, 
131) The table was seven feet long, three f.eet wide 
and three feet high (R. 130) and p~laced on top of the 
canvas and flush against the east wall of the hallway 
(R. 114) north of the east s•tairway. The tool box was 
eighteen inches wide by eighteen inches high (R. 129) 
and placed op·posite the south end of the table from 
two to six inches east of the west wall. The p~aste 
bucket was ten inches high and· placed on 'top' of the tool 
box with a six inch brush in a holder in the bucket. 
(R. 115, 129, 146, 160) A 100-watt ·electric light was 
hanging directly. over the :p1apering 'table about one foot 
down from the ceiling, secured by means of an ·extension 
cord wrapped around the ceiling light fix•ture and 
plugged into an outlet on the east wall under the table. 
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(R. 151, 152) Another 100-watt light in a floor lamp 
without a shade was located at the no:rth stairway on 
the second floor where Mr. Jansen and his helper, Mr. 
Vermaas, were working. There were three stationary 
lights in the hall and one over each stairway. The hall-
way of the second floor was 5 feet 2 inches in width. 
It was 28 feet 6 inches from Mrs. Baker's apartment 
south to the back stairway (R. 127), 56 feet from her· 
apartment north to the east stairway (R. 128), 22 feet 
north from the eas't stairway to the table (R. 127, Ex-
hibit 5) and about 180 feet 'long from the south stairway 
to the north stairway. (R. 186) .· The front stairway 
on the morning of the accident was blocked by a plank 
between 'two ladders. ( R. 115, 143, 155) · 
On the morning in question the plaintiff left her 
apartment at about ten minutes to nine o'clock to go to 
her place of ·employment at the Communi'ty Chest office. 
As she came into the hall she noticed the paper hanger's 
table along the east wall, the canvas underneath the 
table and the container or bucket to the west of the 
table near the west wall and opposite the south end of 
the table. (R. 84, 93-97, 190-192) The two 100-watt 
lights, the stairway light and the center light in the hall 
were burning. She did not recall seeing the tool chest 
nor did she remember seeing the men, but she either 
observed them or heard their voices for she knew they 
w·ere there. She noticed that the canvas was spread 
out covering the carpet, (R. 95) uneven, crumpled and 
bunched at the end of the table. (R. 191) She ob-
served this condition of the canvas and the location of 
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the bucket and table :before she attempted to walk 
throug·h the space bet,veen the bucket and the table and 
to step over the canvas. (R. 192). She stepped over 
the canvas 'vith her left foot, caught her right hee'l in 
it and fell. She fell between the table and the west wall 
with her head to the north. (R. 98) The defendant 
~Ir. Jansen and Mr. \T ermaas ran to her imme-diately, 
and after a few minutes carried her to her apartment. 
STATEMENT O·F ERRORS. 
1. The trial court erred in overruling the general 
demurrer of the defendant, L. Jansen, to the plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (R. 15) 
2. The trial court erred In failing to grant the 
motion of the defendant, L. Jansen, for a nonsuit. 
(R. 24 and 106-7) 
3. The trial court erred in failing to direct the 
jury to return a verdict for the defendant, L. Jansen. 
(R. 25, 39, 194-5 and 197) 
4. The tri·a;l court erred in giving Instruction No. 
5 as follows.: 
''You are instructed that if the defendant, 
L. Jansen, and his em:pJoyees, while performing 
their work in the hallway on the second floor 
of the Roosevelt Apartments, knew or should 
have known that it would not be reasonably 
safe for persons using said hallway to cross 
over the canvas or pass their equipment, then 
it was the duty of said defendant or his em-
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ployees either to block off said hallway where 
they were working or to instruct and advise per-
sons using the same to use the other stair-
way; and if you find from the evidence that 
ithey failed in this duty and that hy reason 
thereof plaintiff, while using ordinary care for 
her own safety, was injured, 'then your verdict 
shall he in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant." (R. 32 and 199-200) 
5. The trial court erred in giving written Instruc-
tion No. 4 as follows : 
''You are instructed that it was the duty 
of the defendant, L.. Jan sen, and his employees 
to keep the floor of the hallway on ·the second 
floor of the apartment building reasonably safe 
for plaintiff in her use of the hallway, and 
that if the said defendant in spreading canvas 
on the floor or in permitting tools and equip-
ment to be left and strewn about the hallway in 
such a manner as to make the hallway danger-
ous, or not reasonably safe for the 'p1laintiff in 
her use thereof, then 'the said defendant was 
negligep_t." (R. 31-2 and 198-9) 
and in giving orally as part of Instruction No. 4, then 
striking the same from the written instruction, the fol-
lowing: 
''And if you find that in exercising ordi-
nary care for her own safety, plaintiff was in-
jured by the negligence of the def-endant, if 
you find ~that the defendant was negligent, then 
your verdict should he for the p~laintiff and 
against the defendant Jan sen.'' ( R. 32' and 
198-9) 
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6. The trial court erred in giving that part of In-
struction No. 8 defining "negligence." (R. 33-4 and 
200) 
7. The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 
10 on the measure of ·damages. (R. 34-5 and 200) 
8. The trial court erre·d in refusing to give the de-
fendant, L. Jansen's requested instruction No. 6 as 
follO"\VS: 
"You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in 
traversing the hallway of the apartment was 
not relieved of the necessity ·of exercising ordi-
nary care for her own safety. If you find that 
the defendant's equipment was placed in the 
hallway in such a manner tha't it constituted a 
hazard which p~laintiff unde-r the circumstances 
should have observed and that plaintiff, not-
withstanding the fact that other exits were 
available to her, p·roceeded 'to take the hazard-
ous course, then you must find that she as-
sumed the risk of any injury which she sus-
tained and your ve~rdict shall he in favor of the 
defendant Jansen, no cause of action." (R. 45 
and 197-8) 
9. The trial court erred in refusing to g1ve the 
defendant L. Jans·en's requested instruction No. 8, as 
r follows: [ 
n 
0 "If you find that the defendant's equip-
a ment was placed in the hallway in such a man-
ner that it constituted a hazard and that plain-
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tiff observed, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care should have observed such hazard, then 
you are ins'tructed that plaintiff was negligent 
in not taking either the east or south stairways. 
which were available to her and your verdict 
shall be against the P'laintiff and in favor of 
f t . " the defendant Jansen, no eause o ac Ion. 
(R. 47 and 198) 
10. The tria:l court erred in refusing to give the 
defendant L. Jansen's requested instruction No. 9, as 
follows: 
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in 
traversing the hallway of the apartment is not 
relieved of the necessity ·of ·exercising ordinary 
care for her own safety regardless of whether 
the equipmen't of the defendant was so placed 
in the· hallway that it did or ·did not constitute 
a hazard. 'Therefore, if you believe from all 
of the evidence that plain tiff acted in a careless 
or n·egligent manner in passing by or over 'the 
equipment and that such carelessness or negli-
gence resulted in the injury complained of, your 
verdict shall he in favor of the defendant L. 
Jan sen, no cause of action.'' ( R. 48 and 198) 
11. The trial court erred in overruling the motion 
of defendant, L. Jansen, for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict of the jury. (R. 26, 6-3 and 204) 
12. The trial court erred in overruling ·defendant, 
L. Jansen's motion for new trial. (R .. 56-7, 63, 66-8 and 
203-6) 
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POINT I. THE COURT ER.RED IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANT, L. JANSEN'S GENERAL 
D E ~f U RRER TO P L A I N T I F F· ' S 
AMENDED COJVIPL·AIN:T. 
Plaintiff :pileads facts in her complaint apiparently 
known to her and observed by her. Th,e part of he:r 
complaint alleging the condition of the hallway and 
charging the defendants with negligence reads as fol-
lows: 
"4. That on the second floor there is a 
hallway extending from the fron't to the rear 
of said floor with a stairway leading to the 
first floor at each end of said hallway. 
"5. That on the 29th day of January, 
1946, while said defendants were papering or 
cleaning the hallway on the second floor of said 
apartment building, said defendants were neg-
ligent and careless in the following particulars, 
to-wit: 
"(a) That the cloth and covering put up 
on [sic] the floor to protect the same was laid 
or permitted to become ruffled and uneven, so 
that ~people traversing said hallway across and 
over said covering might catch their feet in the 
same and fall. 
'' (b) That said defendants negligently and 
carel~ssly pernritte·d their too'ls an·d equipmen't 
to become stre'vn in said hallway so that they 
would be a hazard to people walking down said 
h·a.llway. 
'' (c)' That the defendants failed and neg-
leeted to advis~e and warn individuals using said 
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hallway, and particularly their tenants and s~d 
plaintiff, that they should not walk a'long s·aid 
passage. 
" (d) That the· defendants failed and neg-
lec~t:ed to place barricade or signs across said 
hallway so that tenants and other people would 
be warned not to use said hallway and permitted 
people to traverse back and forth along said 
hallway. 
'' 6. That by reason of the careless and 
negligent acts aforesaid and as the sole and 
proximate cause thereof, plaintiff, while pro-
ceeding along said hallway and wnaw,are of the 
fact that same was not open to use, caught her· 
foot in said cloth or stumbled over the equip-
ment of the defendants, which caused her to 
fall. * * * '' (Italics ours). 
No claim is made that the hallway was not suf-
ficiently lighted nor that plaintiff was in any manner 
unable to see the ruffled and uneven canvas and the 
tools and equipment. Although the canvas, tools and 
equipment in the hall hy any reading of the complaint 
in fact constituted a barricade and a warning, plain-
tiff, heeause she was "unaware" of the fact that the 
same was not open to use, "·caught her foot in said cloth 
or stumbled over the equipment.'' It is doubtful that the 
·complaint S'ta.tes facts sufficient to show culpable neg-
ligence against the defendant, Jansen, as the .condition 
of the hallway as alleged does not show that a hazard 
existed. If the complaint could he construed to allege 
a hazardous condition, plaintiff cannot be heard to say 
that she was unaware of such condition when it was 
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open and obvious, and she does not allege facts show-
ing a reason for her inability to observe it. It is further 
apparent that plaintiff did not have to subject herself to 
the alleged hazard, for, as she states, there wa.s a stair-
\Yay leading to the first floor at each end of the hallway 
and plaintiff does not allege that the hallway was haz-
ardous in all of the directions available to her. 
POINT II. THE DEFENDANT L. JANSEN OR HIS 
EMPLO·YEES WERE NOT 'GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE. 
The defendant, L. Jansen, was eharged with p·utting 
the canvas on the floor of the hallway and permitting 
it to become ruffled and uneven, vvith permitting tools 
and equipment to hecome strewn in the hallway, and 
with failing to :P'lace a barricade or signs or to otherwise 
warn against the use of the hailway. At the close of 
plaintiff's case the plaintiff herself had tesitified as to 
the location and condition of the ·equipment a.s follows: 
''Q. Now, will you describe just what happened 
as you left your a·partment~ 
A. As I came out in the hall, I noticed the clean-
ing there and started out the usual way, but 
I did notice that the canvas was rump·led at 
that end. I step})ed over, but the right foot 
caught either in the hole or bunched canvas, 
and the table vvas holding it so that it didn't 
give, and I fe'll. 
Q. Now, was there any equipment or anything 
in the hallway, or did you notice~ 
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A. The table, the pap~er hanger's 'table al~ne 
and the canvas, and I don't recall anything 
·else that was there. 
Q. Do you remember what side of the hall that 
was. located on~ 
A. On the east. ·The table was along the east 
wall." * * * (R. 84) 
"Q. Now, I believe you stated that as you came 
out of your apartment you observed the 
paper hangers in the hallway. Is that cor-
rect~ 
A. I did. 
* * * 
Q. Could you state how far that table extended 
out from the east wall, ap~p·roximately~ 
A. W eil, as I remember, it was against the east 
wall. 
Q. It was right against the east wall~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then about how far out into the hallway 
would it extend~ 
A. Oh, the average width of a pap.er hanger's 
table. I don't know what that would be. I 
don't know whether it would he three feet 
or a little less, pro bahly. 
Q. About three feet would you say~ 
A. I should say about that, or less, i.f anything. 
I wouldn't be sure. 
* * * 
Q. Then did you observe that -canvas that you 
have mentioned; as you approached the table 
· did you iObse.rve the ClaJnVias? ' 
A. Yies, I d~id. 
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Q. You -observed the canvas? 
.A... Yes. 
Q. ..A.nd ·w·here ,, ... as that located~ 
A. It 'vas spread over the hallway as far as the 
end of the table, first end. 
Q. That would be the south end of the tahle~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. The table was running north and south, was 
it not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the canvas came out to the south end of 
the table. Is that correct~ 
A. That's where I caught my foot, and that was 
the end of th·e canvas. 
* * * 
Q. Now, you say you observed some other equ1p'-
ment there. Did you observe any other equip-
ment besides the canvas~ 
A. It seems to me there was a container against 
the other wall up that way. They were 
getting ready then, of course, that ·e·arly in 
the morning and just putting the things up 
there. 
Q. There was a container against the other wall. 
That would be the west wall of the hallway~ 
A. It seems to me there was something standing 
along, somewher;e along. 
Q. Was. that a bucket~ 
A. It would be, I think, a bucket. 
Q. You think that was a bucket~ 
A. Probably a bucket. 
Q. A paste bucket~ 
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A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. But it was west of the table so it left a very 
narrow passageway for you to get between 
the bucket and the table. Is that ·correct~ 
A. Well, it didn't obstruct the passageway. 
There was p.len'ty of room. I had no thought 
of not being able to get through. The walk 
was. wide enough to go through. 
Q. You thought it was wide ·enough to get 
through~ 
A. Oh, there wasn't anything to make me feel 
that there was no room to get by because 
there was room to get by. 
Q. Was the bucket west of the table, west of 
the south end of the table~ 
A. Yes, be-cause I wouldn't have noti-ced it-it 
was, because I didn't get any farther than 
there, so I wouldn't have seen it. It was. 
near the other wall or by the other wa'll. 
Q. That would be the west wall~ 
A. Uh huh.'' * * • (R. 93-97) 
Regarding the- location of the east stairway and the 
south stairway, which were available for plaintiff's use, 
Mrs. Baker testified as follows : 
'' Q. Now, as you came out of your ap·artment, I 
understand ther·e was a stairway at the south 
end of the hall. Is that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you stated that that stairway led out to 
the back yard of the apartment~ 
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.._\. That's right. 
* * * 
Q. No,Y, that stair,vay also led down to the 
hall,Yay of the main floor, the first floor, did 
it not~ 
.._\. Yes. 
Q. And that stairway connected the first and 
second floor in addition to making a connec-
tion with the rear door of the apartment~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was just one apartment between 
your apartment and that hack stairway. Is 
that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the stairway on the east side, I believe 
you stated that went from the second floor 
down to the east alley, to an alleyway-
A. Yes. 
Q. -that was east of the apartment~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that stairway also eonnected the hallway 
of the sooond floor with the hallway of the 
first floor. Is that -correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then at the front, the front stairway, the 
stairway which you testified you were going 
toward, that stairway went from th·e second 
floor down, from the hallway in the second 
floor down to the hallway of the first floor. 
Is that correct~ 
* * * 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And where that stairway met the hallway of 
the first floor, is that where the front entrance 
to the building was~ 
A. On the first floor, yes. 
Q. Now, the hallway of the first floor ran the 
complete, the full length of the aJpartment 
building, did it not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Just the same as~the hallway of the second 
floor~ 
A. Yes·.''*** (R. 91-93) 
Under 'the allegations of the -complaint, p,lantiff was 
requir;ed to' show that a hazardous condition ·existed and 
that defendant failed to harricade the hallway or other-
wise warn plaintiff of its condition. There was no evi-
·dence that ·defendant's tools and equipment were strewn 
in the hallway. The only evidence adduced by plaintiff 
on this point was that the table, the eanvas and the 
bueket had heen place·d in the hallway. The equipment 
described by her was simple and commonplace. ·The evi-
dence did not show that it had heen negligently :placed 
in the hallway or that it cons~tituted a hazard. Plaintiff, 
in fact, saw every piece of equipment of which she· com-
plains, and observed p~artieularly the canvas before she 
stepp.ed over it, and yet she testified: "there wasn't any-
thing to make me feel that there was no room to get by, 
because there was room to get by.'' 
There was no allegation of improper lighting or 
of any other condition which would restrict plaintiff's 
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ability to see the equipment. As plaintiff saw 'the very 
condition complained of and observed the condition of 
the ranYas before her fall, a barricade or other warning 
would haYe given her no more notice of the condition 
than she already had. The testimony, however, shows 
that the equipment was set up in such a manner that 
it constituted a barricade. All of the evidence shows that 
~Ir. Jansen and his helper, Mr. \r ermaas, ~placed a table 
3 feet 'vide along the east side of the hall and that a. 
bucket was placed on top of a tool box which was near 
the west wall of the hallway and west of the south end 
of the table. While Mrs. Baker testified that she did not 
remember seeing the tool hox, she could not say that i~t 
was not there, and she did remember seeing the bucket. 
The tool box was 18 inches wide and the over-all h·eight 
of the bucket and tool box was 2 feet 4 inches. The hall-
way was 5 feet 2 inches wide, and simple arithmetic 
applied to these facts shows a spaee between the tool 
box an·d table to be so narrow that the equipment itself 
constituted the barricade which it was intended to be. 
Mr. Jansen testified in this regard as follows: 
''Q. Did you leave a space there then to go be-
tween~ 
A. No. It was where we always put it, and we 
put that box there as a definite blockade so 
nobody will go through. 
Q. In other words, you wanted to block off the 
place~ 
A. We wanted to block off the whole width of the 
hall, yes. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Q. 1,he whole ·end of the hall~ 
A. Yes, sir." * * * (R. 132-3)' 
Mr. Jansen and Mr. V·ermaas testified about other 
equipment in the hallway. They described a 100-watt 
lamp hanging from the ceiling directly over the table, 
a 100-watt light in a floor iamp at the north end of the 
hall, and two ladders with a plank betwe·en ~them placed 
in such a manner that they blocked the front stairway. 
No sign was p~laced on or near the barricade, nor was 
Mrs. Baker p~ersonally told not to attem~pt to go through, 
but the equipment of which she complains was so simple 
and obvious, and when she herself states that she ob-
served it, she cannot claim that she had no warning. 
The allegations of the complaint did not state a 
~cause of action against the ·defendant, Jansen, and the 
evidence introduced in the cas-e fe'll short of showing 
actionable negligence on the part of defendant. 
POINT III. THE PLAINTIFF, MRS. BAKER, WAS 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND HAD ASSUMED THE 
RIS:K. 
Plaintiff in trav-ersing the hallway had 'the duty of 
exercising ordinary care for her own safety. If a haz-
ardous condition did not exist then defendant was not 
guilty of negligence as previously pointed out. Assum-
ing without admitting that a hazardous condition existed, 
plaintiff was still required to use ordinary car;e to oh-
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serve such condition. Her testin1ony clearly establishes 
that she knew .. the men 'vere working on the second floor, 
that she observed the location of the table and bucket 
and SR\V the condition of the canvas. We have previously 
quoted plaintiff's testimony in chief, and after defend-
ant \Vas required to put on his case, plaintiff was recalled 
to the stand and testified as follows: 
~ 'Q. Mrs. Baker, you said the canvas wasn't 
folde·d like it is shown in the Exhibit 11 which 
~Ir. Richards showed you. Is that correct~ 
A. That's right, it wasn't folded like that. 
Q. Did you observe whether it was fotded at all~ 
A. Well, I couldn't say as to that. I know it 
wasn't smooth, and I had to step· over it. It 
was uneven, and I felt that it w1as burnche~d 
·at the end of the table, though, just crumpled 
u.p ·and b11.1nched there, ~and I .wid .s:t!ep over 
with my left foot and caught my right heel 
in it, and it was held down by the table and 
didn't give, and it threw me down. 
Q. And you obs~e.rved that condition befiore you 
stepped over-
A. I di:d. 
Q. -with your left foot~ 
A. Well, I was walking right along the hallway 
on my way out to go to work as I always do, . 
and I had no hesitancy about it because it 
seemed perfectly all right, I could step over 
that. 
Q. You say you observed the bucket there~ 
A. Yes, I recall there was a bucket, and it seems 
to me it was right against the wall, and I 
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can't remember any box whatever, and the 
bucket wasn't as a barricade across. I know 
that be-cause I wouldn't have pushed the 
bucket aside or step~ped over it. 
Q. But you do remember the bucket being 
there-
A. Yes. 
Q. You say you don't recall the tool chest being 
over the-re~ 
A. I can't reca;ll there was a box of any kind. 
Q. It could have been there, and you just not 
notice it. Isn't that correct, Mrs. Baker~ 
A. I wouldn't say there was or wasn't. I didn't-
! don't have a picture of it in my mind at all. 
I defonit:ely have a piclu~e of that bucket as 
I just W'alked arownd with p·lenty of ·room, 
the t~able arnd the C(J!Y/.AVas ~and the ru.mple:d 
p1art of ltlhe oaJYI/Vas. I have 'a very p~Zain pie-
ture in my mind ~about that. 
Q. How high did the bucket app.ear to be, Mrs. 
Baker~ 
A. W·ell, I couldn't say how high it was. It 
wasn't very high. May have been before they 
were ready to bring the paste. I don't know. 
I just didn't pay at·tention. It had the ap-
p·earance of a waste can rath·er than a paste 
can. That is what I would say now. I, of 
course, wasn't examining it then and think-
ing about it." ·(R. 190-192) (Italics. ours)· 
If ~the evidence could su:p~port a finding that a dan-
gerous condition existed in the hallway, then p~laintiff 
was negligent in not discovering it. Plaintiff alleges 
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that a hazard existed but does not attempt to ·excuse 
herself for not seeing it. She does not allege improper 
lighting or any other condition "\vhich would restrict her 
ability to see. The equipment was simple and obvious 
and if she did not see it, or seeing it did not recognize 
it as a hazard, it was because she looked ne·gligently. 
In the case of Oswald v. Utah Light arnd R1ailw:ay Com ... 
pamy, 39 Utah 245, 117 !Pac. 46, plaintiff and her 
daughter, who had been shop·ping, entered her auto~ 
mobile which was standing in the street near the sidewalk 
facing west. There was a street railway track in the 
middle of the street upon which an electric engine was 
moving 3 or 4 flat cars in front of it and toward her. 
She turned her automobile toward the south and looked 
east along the track and saw only 'a black object on 
the track, not noticing whether it was moving at that 
time. She did not notice the flat cars at all and she had 
the idea that whatever the black object was she had an 
abundance of time to get across the street. In affirming 
the judgment of nonsuit, this court held: 
''That contributory negligence bars recovery, 
and that a plaintiff, who fails to conform to what 
the law requires of him, or to ·do what a ll'erson 
of prudence would ordinarily have done under 
the same or similar circumstances, is guilty of 
negligence, are axioms of the law. * * * 
''The plaintiff, however, testified that she 
looked, but looked so inattentively or purpose-
lessly that she knew not whether the object seen 
by her was a street car or something else. The 
question, therefore, is not whether a pru~ent per-
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son before attempting· to cross a street -car track 
ordinarily was or was not required to look for 
approaching cars, or whether he ordinarily would 
or would not have done so, but whether a p·rudent 
person, in looking, under the circumstances tes~i­
fied to by plain tiff, and exercising the care In 
that particular that a prudent person ordinarily 
would exercise, would so have -conducted or be-
haved himself that he, under the circumstances 
ordinarily would have seen no more than did 
plaintiff. We must, and do, assume she looked. 
She so testified. * * * 
''May reasonable minds differ that such con-
duct was the ordinary conduct of a p~rudent per-. 
son under the circumstances~ We think not. Coun-
sel say that a prudent person in looking as did 
the plaintiff might well have seen the electric 
engine but not the flat cars, because they were 
considerably lower than the object looked at, and 
because of the infrequency of flat cars pushed or 
drawn along street car tracks. There may be 
cases where one may receive impressions by mis-
taking or misconceiving the facts or objects, or 
their ap·pearance, and act on such imp·ressions, 
and not he guilty of negligence. But one may also 
he guilty of mistaking or misconceiving facts or 
objects or app·ea.rances, negligently. Plaintiff's 
not seeing the flat cars, and not knowing whether 
the black object seen by her was a street car or 
something else, or whether it was standing or 
mo:ving, ·did not result from such a mistake or 
misconception, hut from her conduct in looking 
in an objectless and aimless manner, from her 
negligent or careless behavior in that regard. Be-
cause of that thoughtless and purposeless manner 
of looking and of her -careless conduct in that 
regard, the flat cars were not seen by her, though 
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they "~ere ~plainly visible and almost in her di-
rect path as she undertook to cross the track.'' 
It cannot be claimed :that some condition unknown 
or une:A!)ected to plaintiff caused her to fall. She testi-
fied that she SR\Y and observed the condition of the can-
vas '~just crumpled up and bunched there,'' and stepp·ed 
over with her left foot and caught her right foot in it 
and fell. The canvas was not hidden nor concealed and 
it must be said that plaintiff was negligent as a matter 
of law in the manner in which she stepped over it. 
In the case of MI(Jmes v. Hitne:s ta;rnd McNair Ro:te·ls, 
197 S. W. ( 2d.) 889 ( S. Ct. Tenn. 1946-), the plaintiff 
and her husband sought recovery for injuries resulting 
from a fall on the slippery floor in the hallway on the 
fourth floor of a hotel operated by the defendants. A 
wet spot on the floor about six inches in diameter had 
been caused by water dripping from an overhead hot 
water pipe. Mrs. Manes, a woman of sixty-five years of 
age, came out of her ·room and stepped ·on the wet spot 
on the floor and fell, suffering a broken hip'. It ap·peared 
that she knew about the wet p·lace being there. In re-
versing the judgment of the Court of Appeals which had 
held that the question of contributory negligence was 
for the jury, and in affirming the trial .court which had 
sustained a motion for directed verdict for the defend-
ant, the court said: 
"It was the duty of Mrs. Manes to exercis·e 
ordinary care to avoid injury and .to make rea-
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sonable use of. her faculties to avoid danger; 
and if she used an unsaf~ way when there was a 
safe way for her to travel ·down the hallway, she 
would be guilty of want of ordinary care. M em-
P'his Street R1aiZ.waJy Co. v. Roe, 118 Tenn. 601, 
102 .s,. W. 343; Worsham v. D:empster, 148 Tenn. 
267, 255 S. W. 52." 
''In Amerioarn T1obacco Co. v. Adams, 137 
Ky. 414, 125 S. W. 1067, it wa.s held that there 
could be no recovery by an employee of the To-
bacco Comp·any injured while trucking a load of 
tobacco to its warehouse based upon the mere fact 
that the roof had leaked and the rain had covered 
a certain area of the floor over which he had 
traveled where a similar condition had prevailed 
several times before to his knowledge, and at 
the time in question he was clearly able to see 
and ap·p·reciate any danger which might arise 
from the condition. ' ' 
''In Standard Knitti1~g Mills v. Hickmam, 133 
Tenn. 43, 46, 179 S. W. 385, 386·, the court said: 
'' 'In our op·inion the trial judge and that 
·court should have sustained the motion for such 
peremptory instructions, on the ground that the 
danger was so simp~le and obvious as that the em-
ploye coul·d, at a glance observe and comprehend 
for herself, and so obvio:us as that it was not in-
cumbent on the emp,loyer to give her warning. 
Plaintiff knew that 'the floors were cleaned by 
mopp·ing them with soapy water at intervals, and 
a:lso the direction the colored woman took, in 
doing so, as the latter passed the machine in ques-
tion.' '' 
"The· proof shows without contradiction that 
Mrs. Manes knew about this water drip.ping and 
standing on the floor. She testified that she knew 
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it had existed over a period of many months, and 
that she used this hallway 'vhere this water was 
standing several times each day. We are of opin-
ion that the conclusion is irresistable that her 
contributory negligence bars her recovery as a 
matter of law.'' 
The courts have held that where a dangerous condi-
tion exists and another "\Vay could he used with little, 
or moderate inconvenience, a person who elects to take 
the dangerous way assumes the risks of so doing. When 
plaintiff observed the condition of the hallway she had 
not one but two other exits available to her. The back 
stairway was only 28 feet south from her apartment 
door, and with little inconvenience she eould have gone 
down the south stairway to the first floor and proceeded 
to the front door. ·The east stairway was between her 
apartment and the canvas, and she had 5·6 feet of hall-
way to traverse during wh~ch distance she could observe 
the equipment and without any inconvenience turn to 
the right and use the east stairway to the main floor 
and thence out the front door. Even if she had not seen 
the barricade until she was within a few feet of it, she-
could have returned a distance of not to exceed 22 feet 
and used the east stairway in safety. When p1laintiff oh-
served the equipment as it existed and failed to take 
one of the courses available to her, she was herself guilty 
of negligence and assumed whatever risk there was of 
proceeding past the equipment. 
In R:aymond v. Union Racific R·ailriOiad Co.,_ Utah 
_, 191 P. 2d. 137 (1948), rthe plaintiff employee of con-
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signee knew that gondola cars were used for carrying 
loose material, yet during switching operations he stood 
on the platflorm of a gondola car loaded with scrap metal 
and grasped the end piece of the car in such a manner 
that when p·art of the load shifte·d, his hand was crushed. 
In hoiding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law, this court said: 
'' The obvious truth, from plain tiff's own 
testimony, is that h·e gave no thought to his own 
safety. He placed his hand in a position which 
he knew to be dangerous, when there was a safe 
method open to him. The court below correctly 
held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law.'' 
In the case of Whaletn v. UniJon Pac·ific Coal Q.o., 50 
Utah 455, 168 Pac. 99, the administrator sought to re-
cover for the death of the deceased resulting from de-
ceased's coming into contact with a highly charged 
trolley wire while clmbing into an empty coal car used 
to return the men to the outside of mine and called a 
"man trip". Deceased stepped on the bumper of the 
car instead of boarding from the side and before the 
electricity in the overhead trolley wire had been shut 
off. He was .attemp~ting to get into the car ahead of 
some of his fellow employees in order to get out of the 
mine first. In reversing the judgment for the p[aintiff 
the court held : 
'' The deceased, also, of his own vo'li tion 
hoarded the man trip in a way recognized hy th~ 
employees of the company (and under the cir-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
cumstances presumably known to hi1n) to he ex-
tremely dangerous and hazardous, instead of 
boarding it in the usual and customary way, 
"'"hich involved but little, if any, danger. It ap·-
pears that he did this to avoid the p·rohable in-
convenience of \vaiting ten or fifteen minutes after 
the man trip arrived at the main slop·e before 
being taken out of the mine. He was, therefor~e, 
as a matter of la\v, guilty of negligence-negli-
gence that resulted in, and wa.s the p.roximate 
cause of, his death. ' ' 
In Nauma;n v. Central & Lafayette Re~alty C:ompamy, 
Inc., 60 A. (2d.) 242 (S. Ct. N. J. 1948), the plaintiff sued 
for injuries resulting from slipping on the stairway. 
The plaintiff was the advertising manager ·of a tenant 
in the building and was required to go from his em-
ployer's offices on the fourth floor 't.o those _on the third 
floor. He went to the rear stairway which was nearer 
and convenient to his office and which he had used, for 
his convenience, many times p·rior to the accident. At the 
time of his entering into the stairway, the ligbts on the 
third and fourth floors and the light on the stairway 
were not lighted. Plaintiff walked down the first flight 
of steps until he came to a 'landing midway between the 
floors, which landing consisted of two sections. The 
faint light from a large skylight above made the two 
sections of the landing app·ear to be blended into one 
and he stepi)·ed off the edge of the first section and fell. 
In reversing the judgmen't for the plaintiff and holding 
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that the motions for a nonsuit and for ·a directed verdict 
should have been granted, the court said: 
''The defendant owed the plaintiff the duty 
of exercising ordinary eare to make the premises 
reasonably saf·e. Assuming, but without decid-
ing, that the defendant breached a duty resting 
upon him to artificially light the stairway in ques-
tion, we are of the opinion that it conclusively 
appears that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the 
dangers resulting from his use of the stairway 
under the circumstances and such being the case 
the motions at issue should have been granted.'' 
"To recover, it was the responsibility of the 
p~laintiff to prove by the preponderance of the 
evidence that the proximate cause of his injuries 
was the failure or lack of lights as that was the 
sole and remaining gist of the alleged actionable 
negligenee. If that he so, then he assumed to his 
knowledge the risk of danger from the very thing 
which is the foundation of the eomplaint. Within 
his knowledge, there was also available to him 
for use an elevator and the front stairway. 
CostanZJo v. Prvudent'ial lns11Jrwnce Co., Inc., Sup. 
1938, 121 N. J. L. 361, at page 363, 2 A. 2d. 882. 
There was janitor S'ervice in the building. The 
janitor could have been advised and a correction 
made before the descent was undertaken. 
''The test is whether an ordinary prudent 
person would under the same or similar circum-
stances have incurred the risk which such conduct 
involved. Solomon v. Finer, Sup. 1935, 115 N. J. 
L. 404, 180 A. 567; B·ianchi v. South Par.k Presby-
teriam ·Church, Err. & App. 1939, 123 N. J. L. 325, 
8 A. 2d 567, 12'4 A.L.R. 808. Where it indisput-
ably ap·pears to the contrary, the question is one 
of law for the court.'' 
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The cases of Bitanchi v. South Park P,e:sbyteriwn 
Church, 123 N. J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d. 567, and S:olomon v. 
Fin.er, 115 N. J. L. 404, 180 A. 567, cited by the court 
above, both deal 'vith the use hy plaintiff of unlighted 
stairways when the danger could have been avoided. 
In the Biarnchi case the court said: 
''Reason and justice dictate that one can-
not deliberately incur an obvious risk, especially 
where 1)ireventive means are at hand, and then 
hold the author of the danger for the ensuing 
damage. Whether such conduct he classed as an 
assumption of risk or contributory negligence, 
it precludes recovery. There was no controversy 
here as to what plaintiff did or failed to do; and 
the evidence was not fairly susceptible of diver-
gent inferences on the question of whether her 
conduct met the requirements of due care. It 
did not reasonably admit of an affirmative answer 
to that inquiry. Plaintiff was sui juris. She in-
disputably knew and app.reciated the hazard of 
injury arising from the special circumstances. 
The danger was obvious to one reasonably regard-
ful for his own security. And there was no ele-
ment of compulsion in what plaintiff did. The 
course taken was wholly voluntary; it was in no 
sense one of necessity or reasonably to be con-
sidered as such by the actor. She did not take 
advantage of known available means to insure 
her safety. s.he made no effort to ap~prize the 
sexton of her p·light, either directly or through 
others in ~the building, nor did she secure the aid 
of the light in the locker room which the op·en-
ing of the door would have provided. Thus, it 
conclusively appears that, fully comprehending 
the risk, plaintiff chose to rely upon her ability to 
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descend the stairs without mishap·; and in such 
circumstances she cannot visit upon the sexton the 
.consequences of her falL Comp·are Gleason v. 
B~oehrn, 58 N. J. L. 4'75, 34 A. 886, 32 L. R. A. 645; 
Saumders v. Sm.ith Rie1alty O~o., 84 N. J. L. 276, 
86 A. 404; Rooney v. Siletti, '96· N. J. L. 312, 115 
A. 664; Siolomovn v. Fine·r, 115 N. J. L. 404, 180 
A. 5i67. The cases of Andre v. Mertens, 88 N.J. L. 
626, 96 A. 893, and Roth v. Prot1os, 120 N. J. L. 
502, 1 A. 2d. 10, are factually distinguishable.'' 
In the Solomon cas·e the eourt pointed out that plain-
tiff proceeded into a dark s:tairway without seeking light 
or aid and held as follows : 
''Respondent, in these circumstances, was 
plainly guilty of culpable negligence. The obli-
gation rested upon him to exercise reasonable care 
for his own safety. 'The inquiry is whether fair-
minded men might honestly differ as to whether 
his conduct was such as one exercising ordinary 
care and p-rudence would have ipillrsued under 
the circumstances. Pesin v. Jugovich, 85 N. J. 
Law, 256, 88 A. 1101. And it must, perforce, be 
answered in the negative. His ·0onduct was not 
the subject of conflicting evidence; nor does the 
evidence reasonably permit of divergent infer-
ences res:p,e-cting it. * * *' 
''The evidence did not fairly admit of an 
inference of reasonable care hy respondent. On 
the contrary, it indisputably app'ears that he, by 
the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided 
the consequences to himself of app·ellant's negli-
gence f.ound by the trial judge. See Gle1asorn v. 
Boehm, 58 N. J. Law, 475, 34 A. 886, 32 L. R. A. 
645; Saunders v. Smith Realty C1o., 84 N. J. Law, 
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~76, 86 ~-\. 404; Egge1"t v. illutu.al G~ocery Co., 
111 N. J. La,v, 502, 168 A. 312.'' 
In the case of Harmo1U!J Realty C1o. v. Underwoo1d, 
161 N. E. 92± (S,. Ct. Ohio 1928), plaintiff sought ~to re-
cover for injuries received when she stumbled on loose 
stones covering the sidewalk and was thrown upon a 
pile of crushed stone lying adjacent thereto. Plaintiff 
"~as a tenant in a building owned by the defendant and 
was accustomed to using the rear entrance and 'the side-
walk which was in the process of being cemented. Plain-
tiff testified, as she proceeded along the sidewalk, she 
saw the c-rushed stone lying thereon, some as small in 
size as a navy bean and some as large a.s an inch in 
diameter. In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff 
and holding that the trial court erred in refusing to 
direct a verdict for the defendant as requested, the court 
stated: 
''The plaintiff testified to the character of 
the place where she slipped and fell. She saw 
the stones on the sidewalk; she had actual notice 
of the situation, that the defendant did not have, 
and, under the circumstances, testified ~to by her, 
she assumed the risk of which she now complains; 
she attempts to relieve herself of her own lack 
·of care by testifying that, upon her return, sh:e 
had a basket of provisions in one hand and a 
hand bag in the other. While this may have im-
paired her efforts to successfully pass over ~these 
pebbles or ston:es, it did not relieve her from the 
exercise of due care, incumbered as she was with 
the packages which she carried, especially where 
she testified that only a few minutes before she 
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ing the safety of the walk. The ~testimony is un-
disp·uted that the plaintiff eould have safely enter-
ed her apartment by the front instead of the rear 
entrance and thereby have avoided the obstruc-
tion. She not only voluntarily passed over a place 
wher·e the source of danger was plainly visible, 
but she had actual notice of it~ attendant risk. 
Village of C·onne,aut v. Naef, 54 Ohio St. 529, 
44 N. E. 236." 
Assumption of risk 1s not limited to master and 
s-ervant cases. This is set out by this court in the case of 
'Baylor v. Bamberger Electric R. C~o., 62 Utah 552, 220 
Pac. 695 (1923). There P'laintiff recovered judgment 
against the defendant carrier for injury sustained while 
a passenger on defendant's train. Plaintiff was return-
ing from Lagoon to Ogden on Labor Day and boarded 
a very crowded car, standing in the· aisle until the train 
had reached Layton, about six miles from Lagoon on the 
way to Ogden. At Layton, plaintiff and a friend went 
through a window in the ear, because of the crowded 
condition and smoke in the car, and ran to the rear 
of 'the train and got on the steps of one of the open 
cars, which steps were also erowded and difficult to hold 
on to. During the subsequent ride the train lurched in a 
place where there appeared to be some. defect in the 
track and plaintiff was thrown from the car and in-
jured. In re¥ersing the judgment for the plaintiff, the 
court said: 
''As pointed out by this court in K uchen-
'me:ister v. L. A. & 8. L. R. R. Co., 52 Utah 116 
' 
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172 Pac. 725, there is a clear distinction between 
contributory negligenee, and assun1ption of risk. 
It has, ho,vever, also been held that under cer-
tain circtunstances the same acts or conduct may 
make one guilty of contributory negligence and 
also giYe rise to the defense of assump1tion of 
risk. 
~'The undisputed facts and circumstances, 
according to the authorities to which we shall 
hereinafter refer, clearly bring this case within 
the doctrine just stated. In view of plaintiff's. 
statements, there is not a shadow of doubt that 
he acted with full knowledge of all the circum-
stances surrounding him and that all he did in 
the premises was done deliberately and with full 
appreciation of the dang.er to which he exp·osed 
himself. True, he may not have anticipated the 
lurching or swaying of the cars; hence it is con-
tended that because the lurching of the cars was 
due to the defendant's negligence plaintiff did not 
assume the risk. It no doubt is true that under 
ordinary circumstances a passenge-r will not be 
held to have assumed a risk arising out of a 
carrier's negligence. In this ease, howeve-r, the 
circumstances are extraordinary.'' · 
The cases of N~aumarn v. ·Cent'ral and Lafayette 
Re~alty Compwny, Inc., supra, B·ianchi v. South Park 
Presbyteriwn Church, supra, Wilson v. Lai[Jiham Re:al Es-
tlate Company, 175 A. 480 (S. C. & R. I.); Whalen v. 
Union Pacific c~oa.l Compawy, sup~ra, all indicate that not 
only is the defense of contributory negligence available 
but also the defense of assumption of risk. 
In Costanzo et .al v. Prudootia.l Ins. Co., Inc., 121 
N. J. L. 361, 2 A. (2d) 882 (S. Ct. N. J. 1938), the cour.'t 
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reversed the judgment for the plaintiff for injuries sus-
tained when he tripped on a broken stairway step in 
defendant's building. Plaintiff was ·employed by de-
fendant's tenants as a store clerk and was sent to the 
cellar to get some wrapping J:l1aper. ·There were three 
s-eparate stairways to the building and plaintiff knew 
that the other stairways were available and that the 
stairway on which he trip·ped was in bad condition. The 
court held: 
''We are ·entirely satisfied that, were the 
question of negligence alone involved, the trial 
judge would have been correct in submitting this 
cause to the jury to determine whether defend-
ant breached its duty to use rieasonable care to 
keep the stairway in a safe and usable condition. 
Roth v. Prot:os, 120 N. J. L. 502, and cases therein 
cited on p·age- 504, 1 A. 2d. 10, 11. But the exist-
ence of negligence was not the sole issue here. 
For, conceding defendant's negligence, we are 
equally well satisfied that plaintiff failed to es-
tablish a right of recovery, sin0e he clearly as-
sumed what risk there was in using the stairway 
in question. By his own admissions it appears 
that the broken condition of the steps :prevailed 
throughout his entir·e employment of about four 
months; and ~that he 'often' used that stairway. 
Furthermore, plaintiff himself testified that the 
stairway was in 'very had condition' and that he 
considered it 'dangerous'. In addition to all this, 
and unlike the p·roof in H·etrm.an v. Home Owwers' 
Loan Corp10111ation, 120 N. J. L. 437, at foot of 
page 440, 200 A. '7 42, a~t page 7 44, which was 'that 
no other way was available,' the plaintiff here 
could have used either of the other two available 
stairways the saf·ety of which had not been chal-
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lenged. To use the stair,vay he did under these 
circumstances 'vas to assume the risk which might 
and did result from that use. V olenti non fit in-
JUria. 
· · 'V e perceive nothing which distinguish·es 
the instant case from the holdings in Vorr"tath v. 
B1trke, 63 N. J. L. 188, 42 A. 838, and Rtooney v. 
Siletti, 96 N. J. L. 312, 115 A. 664. Cf. Ra~en­
burg v . ..~..4.ugitst, 119 N. J. L. 83, esp~ecially cases 
collated on page 87, 194 A. 152, 154. '' 
In the case of Birthisel v. Corncord Premium Build-
ing & Lo(Jf(t Ass 'n., 343 Pa. 194, 22 A. 2d. 685 ( S. Ct. Pa. 
1941), plaintiff, who had been living with her daughter 
for several weeks, knew of the defective steps of her 
daughter's rented home and although she could have 
used another exit with hut slight inconvenience chose to 
use the dangerous steps and was injured when one of 
the steps broke. The -court held : 
''The court below p·roperly ·entered a com-
pulsory nonsuit as the testimony elearly estab-, 
lishes that plaintiff 'vas guilty of contributory 
negligence in testing a known danger. There was 
no necessity for her to leave by the ste~ps which 
she knew were in a dangerous condition. ·She 
could have used the exit through the cellar with 
but slight inconvenience. Having chosen to use 
a way subject to risk and danger, when a safe 
way was available to her, she must bear the con-
sequences of her ehoice: Levli)t!t v. BIG Swnd!wich 
Shop~s, Inc., 294 Pa. 291, 144 A. 71; Boyd v. Kern-
sitngtion Wa:t.er ~co., 316 P·a. 522, 175 A. 395; Smith 
v. Pittsburgh, 338 Pa. 216, 12 A. 2d. 788; V1alente 
v. Lindner, 340 Pa. 508, 17 A. 2d. 37l. 
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In J oh(YW)ton v. Tounangeau et al, 259 N. W. 187 
(S. Ct. Minn. 1935 ), plaintiff tenant tripped on a broom 
handle on an unlighted rear stairway. There was an 
additional stairway in front, well lighted and well known 
by the 1plaintiff. In affirming the verdict directed in 
favor of the defendant, the court said: 
''If plaintiff was to take th.e risk of walking 
in darkness 'feeling his way,' he assumed the risk 
of encountering such a common and customarily 
used article as a broom. Id. § 7041a. This feature 
of defendants' claimed negligence is indeed weak 
and unsatisfactory. Be that as it may, the fact 
remains that plaintiff chose a route of darkness 
rather than one of light. He should not be heard 
to complain.'' 
In C~olburn v. 8hu~avlev, 24 Cal. App. 2d. 298, 74 
P. (2d.) 1060 (CaL 1938) (Hearing denied), the plain-
tiff, a tenant of the defendant, sued to recover damages 
for injuries sustained when she tripped over a defective 
rug in defendant's apartment and fell. She had removed 
the rug from its usual place in the hall and had placed 
it on the living room rug for the purpose of cleaning it. 
The front door bell rang, she hurried to the door, tripped 
on the rug, fell and was injured. Plaintiff had twice 
notifi.ed defendant's manager of the defect in the rug 
and had been p·romised that it would be repiaired. In 
affirming a nonsuit for the defendant the court said: 
'' 'In the absence of special warranty or 
~greement, the te~ant iJ?- ~aking ~the leased prem-
Ises assumes all risks arising from damages which 
are obvious to ordinary observation.' 
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"It is sufficient to cite in support of the 
text Wat·wood v. F~osdick, 212 Cal. 84, 297 P. 881; 
Griggs v. Corok, 106 Cal. App·. 551, 289 P. 693; 
Ellis v. Jl eN eese, 109 Cal. Ap.p. 667, 293 P. 854; 
Priver v. Yowng, ·62 Cal. App1. 405, 216 P. 966, and 
r'"an Eve.ry v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563. The purport of 
these decisions is that, when a 'tenant voluntarily 
remains on leased premises with full knowledge 
of their dangerous or defective condition, he as-
sumes all risks which are obvious to ordinary 
observation.'' 
The following cases further support defendant's 
position that plaintiff was gui'lty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law in failing to observe and app·re-
ciate the condition of the hallway and in failing to pay 
attention to the manner in which she stepp·ed over the 
canvas and that she was guilty of contributory negli-
gence and assumed the risk in p·roceeding as she did 
where other stairways were available for her use: Ward 
1:. Clark, 177 S. E. 212 (S. Ct. of Ap·p., Va.); Wilson v. 
Lalpham Real Esta;t·e Comparrt;y, 175 A. 480 (S. Ct. R.I.); 
Fo111!Jo v. Chioago TitLe ·& Trwst Camp1GIYII!J, 16 N. E. 2d. 
192 (Ill. Ap·p.); F1abel v. Boehmer Re1alty C~omip'amty, 227 
S.W. 858 (Mo.); Wright v. ~ones) 193 So. 197 (La.); ·and 
Cutno v. Scrra;nton Medical Arts Building, 198 A .. 141 
( S. Ct. Penn.). 
Under Points I, II and III, defendant has set forth 
the failure of plaintiff's ~mended eomplaint to state a 
cause of action, the failure of plaintiff's evidence to show 
culpable negligence on the part of defendant or his em-
ployees, and that plaintiff herself was guilty of con-
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tributary negligence and had assumed the risk as a 
matter of law. Such being the case, it follows that de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been 
granted, and likewise defendant's motion for nonsuit, 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
motion for new trial. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN IN-
STRUC·TING THE JURY ON P'LAIN-
TIFF 'S THEO·RY OF THE CAS~E AS 
SET FORTH IN HER PLEADINGS 
AND NO·T IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE EVIDENCE, AND IN R.EFUSING 
TO. INSTRUCT THE JURY O·N DE-
FENDAN·T'S THEORY OF THE CASE 
AS REQUESTED. 
In Instruction No. 4, which will he discussed more in 
detail as Point V, the trial court gave p1laintiff's re-
quested Instruction No. 3, as follows : 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of 
the defendant, L. Jansen, and his employees to 
keep the floor of :the hallway on the s:econd floor 
of the apartment building reasonably safe for 
plaintiff in her us-e of the hallway, and that if the 
said defendant in spreading canvas on the floor 
or in permitting tools and equipm;ent to be left 
and strewn about the hallway in such a manner 
as ~to make the hallway dangerous, or not reason-
ably safe for the p1aintiff in her use thereof then 
the said defendant was negligent." (R. 31-2· and 
52.) 
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In Instruction No. 5 the trial court gave plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 2, as follows: 
'"You are instructed that if the defendant, 
L. Jansen, and his employees, while performing 
their "\York in the hallway on the second floor of 
the R,oosevelt Apartments, knew or should have 
known that it "\vould not be reasonably safe for 
:persons using said hallway to cross over the 
canYas or pass their equipment, then it was the 
duty of said defendant or his employees either 
to block off said hallway where they were working 
or to instruct and advise persons using the same 
to use the other stairway; and if you find from 
the evidence that they failed in this duty and 
that by reason thereof plaintiff, while using ordin-
ary care for her own safety, was injured, then 
your verdict shall be in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant." (R. 32 and 51.) 
In Instruction No. 8 (R. 34) the trial court defined 
negligence to the jury and in Instruction No. 10 the 
court instructed the jury on the measure of damages. 
(R. 34-5). In giving these instructions the court sub ... 
mitted plaintiff's entire theory of the case to the jury 
and instructed the jury on plaintiff's pleadings, which 
were not supported by the evidence. The giving of these 
instructions was excepted to by defendant (R. 198-200) 
and assigned as error in the Statement of Errors 4, 5, 
6 and 7. 
As discussed under Point I, there was no showing 
of negligence on the part of plaintiff, and it was error 
for the court to give any instructions on negligence. Cer-
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tainly there was no proof that equipment and tools were 
"strewn about the hallway." The defendant's evidence 
was that they were placed there in an orderly and 
systematic manner and this testimony was not disputed 
hy il'l~intiff. The equipment was simple and obvious and 
was observed hy defendant. When plaintiff saw the very 
thing which she claims constituted a hazard, a barricade 
or warning as required by Instruction No. 5 could give 
plaintiff no more notice than she already had, and to 
instruct the jury that the defendant had the duty to 
''block off said hallway where they were working or to 
instruct and advis-e p·ersons using the same to use the 
other stairway" was error. 
Even more serious was the court's refusal to in-
struct the jury on defendant's theory of the case, and its 
refusal to give defendant's requested Instructions ·6, 
8 and 9, as follows : 
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in tra-
versing the hallway of the apartment was not 
relieved of the necessity of exercising ordinary 
care for her own safety. If you find that the de-
fendant's equipment was placed in the hallway 
in such a manner that it constituted a hazard 
which plaintiff under the circumstances should 
have observed and that p~laintiff, notwithstanding 
the fact that other exits were available to her, 
proceeded to take 'the hazardous course, then you 
must find that she assumed the risk of any injury 
which she sustained and your verdict shall be in 
favor of the defendant Jansen, no cause of. ac-
tion.'' (R. 45) 
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'~If you find that the defendant's equipment 
"~as placed in the hallw·ay in such a manner that it 
constituted a hazard and that plaintiff observed, 
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have 
observed such hazard, then you are instructed 
that plaintiff vvas negligent in not taking either 
the east or south stairways which were available 
to her and your verdict shall be against the plain-
~tiff and in favor of the defendant Jansen, no 
cause of action." (R. 47) 
''You are instructed that Mrs. Baker in tra-
versing the hallvvay of the apartment is not re-
lieved of the necessity of exercising ordinary care 
for her own safety regardless of whether the 
equipment of the defendant was so placed in the 
hallway that it did or did not constitute a hazard. 
Therefore, if you believe from all of the evidence 
that plaintiff acte-d in a careless or negligent 
manner in passing by or over the equipment and 
that such carelessness or negligence resulted in 
the injury complained of, your verdict shall be 
in favor of the defendant L .. Jan sen, no cause of 
action." (R. 48) · · 
The defendant excepted to the court's refusal to 
give these requested instructions (R. 197-8) and has as-
signed such refusal as e-rror in Statement of Errors 8, 
9 and 10. In Instruction No. 6 the court did instruct that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence if she 
failed "to keep a lookout for her own safety" or "to 
observe the condition which existed in the hallway.'' But 
defendant claimed also that if the jury found that a 
hazard existed which should have bee·n observed b;y 
plaintiff and that she took the hazardous course when 
other exits were available to her, she assumed the 
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risk (defendant's requested Instruction 6) that if a 
hazard existed that should have been observed by plain-
tiff, then she was negligent in not taking either the east 
or south stairways which were available to her (def.end-
dant's requested Instruction 8) and that the plaintiff 
was negligent in the manner in which she stepped over 
the.eanvas (defendant's requested Instruction 9). 
;This court has held in the case of Pratt v. Vtlah LighJt 
and Traction ~Co., 57 Utah 7, 16.g Pac. 868, that .a defin!i-
tion of contributory negligence as want of ordinary care, 
though abstractly correct, should he specifically app,lied 
to the circumstances of the case. In its opinion the court 
said: 
"Each p·arty to a suit is entitled to have his 
theory, when there is evidence to sustain it, sub-
mitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury 
on the facts tending to suppor:t such theory, as-
suming a;lways that there is testimony offered to 
sup·port the same, and this court has so held in 
Hartley v. Salt Lake: City, 41 Utah 121, 124 Pac. 
522, where, s:peaking through Straup, J., iit is said: 
'' ' There are two parties to a lawsuit. 
Each, on a submission of the ease to the jury, 
is entitled to a submission of it on his theory 
and the law in respect thereof. The defend-
ant's theory as to the cause of the accident 
is embodied in the p·roposed requests. There· 
is some e~dence, as we have shown, to render 
them appl1cahle to the eas:e. That is not dis-
p·uted. We think the court's refusal to charge 
substantially as requested was error. That 
the ruling was prejudicial and works a re-
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Yersal of the judgment IS self-:evident and 
lmavoidable.' '' 
In the ease at bar the trial court defined contribu-
tory negligence generally and gave defendant's re-
quested instruc.tion on c.ontributory negligenc.e as applied 
to her failure to keep a lookout for her own safety and 
to observe the condition in the hallway (Instruction 6), 
but the c.ourt in refusing to give defendant's requested 
Instructions 6, 8 and 9 failed to instruct the jury on de-
f.endant's theory that plaintiff was also negligent in not 
taking the east or south stairway, that she was negligent 
in the manner in which she stepped and that she assumed 
the risk of the danger of which she -complains. There 
was evidence to support defendant's claim that plaintiff 
·proc.eeded negligently. She testified that she saw the 
·condition of the canvas, step·ped over it with her left 
foot and caught her right he·el in it. The defendant was 
entitled to have the jury instructed on contributory negli-
gence as it app[ied to the manner in which plaintiff 
stepped and defendant's requested Instruction 9 should 
have been given. Plaintiff testified that she observed the 
condition of the equipment in the hallway and she knew 
that the east and south stairways were available for 
her use. The defendant was entitled to have the jury in-
structed on contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk as app·lied to plaintiff's failure to use one of the 
other ways which were available to her as requested 
by defendant's requested Instructions 6 and 8. 
In Morga;n v. Bimgham St;age Lines C-o., 75 Utah 87, 
283 Pac. 160, the trial court instructed the jury on the 
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contributory negligence of the deceased, O-rson Morgan, 
as follows: 
'' 'You are instructed that contributory negli-
gence is the failure to use that ordinary care and 
diligence that would be expected of an ordinary 
prudent p·erson ·of similar age and experience 
to that of the deceased, Orson Morgan, under 
like circumstances to avoid an injury. Therefore, 
even though you find that the def·endants were 
negligent, still, if you find that the deceased, Or-
son Morgan, did not exercise that ordinary care 
and diligence to prevent injury 'to himself that 
would he expected of ordinary and ·prudent per-
sons of similar age and exp·erience situated as 
Orson Morgan was, you should find for the de-
fendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of 
action.' '' 
After quoting the rule laid down by Justice Straup in 
Rart.Zey v. Salt Lake City, su~pra, the court said and held: 
"Respondent's couns:el apparently do not 
contest this rule of law, hut they argue these re-
quests were substantially covered, as the court 
found was the case in the cases cited. The court 
in other instructions set forth fully plaintiff's 
rtheory of the evidence as to the alleged negligence 
on the part of the defendants, hut, except as 
pointed out, gave no instructions on defendants' 
theory. 
''While the requests are not models of ac-
curacy, we think the defendants were :entitled 'to 
have at least the substance of the same given so 
as to pTesent their theory of the evidence to the 
jury, and that a failure on the part of the c.ourt 
to do so was prejudicial error.'' 
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In .A.nde.rson v. Niels:ovn, et al, 43 Utah 564, 137 Pac. 
152, the trial court submitted plaintiff's theory of the· 
case to the jury and ·submitted one of defendant's the-
ories of the cause of the accident but failed to instruct 
on an additional theory requested by defendant. In re-
versing the judgment of the trial court and granting a 
new trial the court said : 
''The defendant requested a submission of 
the case on the theory that he was not responsible 
for the piremature releasing of the snubbing rope-, 
if the order given by him was directed to the 
man at :the rear tackle but was misunderstood by 
the men at the snubbing rope, and that rope pre-
maturely released because of such misunderstand-
ing or mistake, as did the plaintiff on the theory 
that the defendant was. responsible if the order 
given hy him was dir.ected and given to ~the men 
at the snubbing post. The court submitted the 
case on both such theories. The defendant, in 
addition, also requested the court to submit the 
case on the ~theory that the failure of the man 
to release the rop·e at the rear tackle, and who had 
been commanded to release it, was the cause of the 
accident. The court refused that request, and did 
not submit the case upon such theory. The court 
erred in ~that. * * * '' 
There is a clear distinction between contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk. This distinction has 
been recognized by this -court. 
In the case of Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S. L. 
R. 'C·o., 52 Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725 ·(1918), the plaintjff was 
injured while employed in defendant's roundhouse and 
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machine shop while engaged in repairing a passenger 
engine and using an emery wheel to grind down a pin. 
A small piece of steel or other hard substance was thrown 
off from said emery wheel which entered his eye and 
resulted in the eyeball being removed. The court dis-
cussed the two defenses as follows : 
''Assuming however, for the purpose of this 
decision, that the jury found that plaintiff's con-
duct at the time of the. injury was negligent, and 
hence found him guilty of contributory negligence 
in that regard, yet it does not necessarily follow 
that counsel's contention that plaintiff assumed 
the risk should prevail. The defenses of assumed 
risk and contributory negligence are entirely in-
dependent, and in case there is a conflict in the 
evidence, or where the facts are such that rea-
sonable men may legitimately draw different con-
clusions from the evidence, or may arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions, it cannot be determined as a 
matter of law that either the one or the other 
defens-e is established, and 'the jury may there-
fore find that one of the defenses was ·established 
and may also find that the other was not. While 
in some of the cases there is some confusion re-
s:piecting the distinction between the two defenses, 
yet, as a general rule, 'the courts have found little 
difficulty in enforcing the true distinction. The 
distinction is, perhaps, as well and clearly stated 
in a few words as that can he done in the case of 
Thomas v. Quartermaine, in L. R. 18, Q. B. Div. 
at page 697, where, in discussing the distinction, 
it is said: 
" 'But 'the doctrine of volenti non fit in-
juria (assumed risk) stands outside the de-
fense of contributory negligence and is in 
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no \Yay limited by it. In individual instances 
the t\YO ideas sometimes se·em to cover the 
same ground, b·ut ca.relessness is not the same 
t king as i.ntellig·ent choice.' '· (Italics ours.) 
POINT \ 1• THE TRlA_L COURT ERRED IN GIV-
IKG INSTRUCTION NO. 4 AND IN IN-
STRUCTING THE: JURY O·RALL Y AND 
THEN S.TRIKING A PART THEREOF 
FRO~I THE WRITTEN INSTRUCTION. 
The trial court ·orally gave rto the jury plaintiff's 
requested instruction No. 3 as follows : 
"You are instructed that it was the duty 
of the defendant L. Jansen, and his employees to 
keep the floor of the hallway on the second floor 
of the apartment building reasonably safe for 
plaintiff in h·er use of the hallway, and that if 
the said defendant in spreading canvas on the 
floor or in permitting tools and equipment to be 
left and strewn about the hallway in such a 
manner as to make the hallway dangerous, or not 
reasonably safe for the plaintiff in h·er US'e there-
of, then the said defendant was negligent, ·and rif 
you fimd that in exercising Drdmary cra,re fior 
her own safety, plaintiff w~as i·njured by the ·negli-
gence of the defendJant, if you fond tlvat the de-
fendant w·as negligent, then your ve.rdict should 
be for the plaintiff amd .agaifnst the defendarnt 
Jansen.'' 
After the court had given the instruction orally, he 
struck from the written instruction that part which is 
italicized. Defendant ex:cepted to the giving of Instruc-
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tion No. 4 and particularly to the court orally instruct-
ing the jury in the language italicized above. (R .. 198-9) 
The court offered to recall the jury and reread Instrue-
tion No. 4 to them but thought that to do so would give 
' . 
emphasis to the instruction. The court did not offer to 
change Instruction No. 4 and the def·endant has assigned 
as error both the giving of written Instruction No. 4 and 
the reading of that part which was striken. (Statement 
of Error 5) 
In giving Instruction No. 4, the court in effeet in-
structed the jury that defendant Jansen was guilty of 
negligence. The -court said ''that if the said defendant 
in sprBading the oam;pas on the fZo~r or im p~ermi~ting 
the tools (})'Ybd ~equipment to be ~eft amd strewn about the 
hallwoi!J in such a maxnmer as t~o make the hal!Jw.ay ·d(J/yt,ger-
ous 10r 1'/)0it re,asonably s~afe fior the pZaJ.intiff in he.r use 
thereof, then the defendant was negligent. A careful 
reading of the instruction shows that there was nothing 
left for the jury to determine. The court has in effect 
stated that it is undisputed that the canvas was spread 
in such a manner as to make the hallway dangerous and 
not reasonably safe for the p:laintiff and that the tools 
and equipment were permitted to be left and strewn 
about the hallway in such a manner as to make the hall-
way dangerous and not reasonably safe for plaintiff. 
A . similar situation was before this court in W~ebb v. 
Snow, et ~al. 102 Utah 435, 132 P. (2d) 114, which involved 
an ~lleged assault ·and battery against plaintiff. There 
was a dispute in the testimony as to whether plaintiff was 
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conscious,·' "'""hether she ''suffered a miscarriage,'' and 
as to the force with which she was struck. The court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
''The eourt instructs you that if you believe 
from the evidence that the plaintiff was ·p~regnant 
at the time she was rendered 'wncons~cious by the. 
blow delivered by one of the defendants' em-
ployes, and as a result of said blow and being 
lmocked to the floor she suffered a miscarriage 
and thereby the loss of her unborn child, you may 
award her money damages for the Zoss of said 
·unb·o·rn child.'' (Italics added.) 
In reversing the judgment of the lower court and 
holding the instruction to be ~prejudicial error, the court 
said: 
"The foregoing instruction .disregarded en-
tirely the fact that there was considerable dispute 
and conflict in the evidence. The instruction, 
standing alone, would amount to an .instruction 
to find in favor of the plaintiff if 'the jury found 
that plaintiff was p·regnant at the time she was 
struck, and if they also found that a miscarriage 
resulted. The instruction assumes that defend-
ants' employees were to blame for what occurred, 
and that the evidence was uncontradicted as to 
the following: ( 1) That plaintiff was 'rendered 
unconscious' by the 'blow,' and (2) that she was 
knocked to the floor. The instruction is so worded 
that it indicated to the jury a belief on the part 
of the court that defendants' employees were 
blameworthy irrespective of the acts of plaintiff. 
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As stated in St~ate v. S·eymovwr, 49 Utah 285, 163 
P. 789, 792: 
'' 'Courts, in charging jurors, should be 
very careful not ~to assume any material fact 
or facts. Jurors, who are laymen, are al-
ways eager to follow the opinion or judgment 
of the cou.rt, and if the court assumes any ma-
. terial fact in the charge, the jurors are most 
likely to follow the assumptions of the court. 
Indeed, we must assume that such is the 
case unless the record clearly shows the con-
trary.' 
''The foregoing statement was quoted with 
approval in Sbate v. Homxma, 81 Utah 583, 21 P. 
2d. 537, at page 540. While both were criminal 
cases, the principle announced therein applies 
with ·equal force to jury trials in civil eases. The 
court must not resolve ·conflicts in evidence for the 
jurors or indicate what particular testimony the 
trial court believes correctly states the facts. 
* * * " 
In requesting the court to give Instruction No. 4, 
plaintiff led the court into error. The first part of the 
Instruction as it was read to the court entirely disre-
garded the fact that there was a dispute in the evidence 
and assumed that the evidence was uncontradicted as to 
the defendant's spreading the canvas and permitting 
the tools and equipment to be left and strewn about the 
hallway in such a manner as to make it dangerous. That 
part of the instruction standing alone amounted to an 
instruction to find the defendant negligent, and it stood 
alone when the court struck the part italicized above 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
from the 'Yritten instruction. The court's striking the 
last part of the instruction as it "'"as given orally left 
the erroneous part standing alone and exaggerated its 
importance in the minds of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff in this case was fully aware of the 
condition of which she complains. She testified that she 
knew the defendant Jansen and his men were working 
in the hallway and that she saw the ~paper hanger's 
table, the paste bucket and the canvas. She knew that 
the east and south stairways were available for her use 
and that without any inconvenience she could have 
walked down either stairway to the main floor and out 
the front door. She testified that she observed the con-
dition of the canvas, bunched and uneven, and stepp·ed 
over it with her left foot and caug~t her right heel in 
it. Plaintiff complains that a hazard was created by 
defendant and that she was not warned of its exist-
ence, yet the fact is undisp·uted that defendant's equip-
ment was open and obvious and that plaintiff fully ob-
served the situation of which she complains. The facts 
as applied to the law make it clear that plaintiff's ·own 
negligence in stepping as she did caused her to fall 
and that as a matter of law she was herself guilty of 
negligence and assumed the risk of proceeding as she 
did when other stairways were available to her. The 
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defendant's motion for nonsuit should have been grant-
·ed, and likewise, in order, his motion for directed ver-
dict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for 
new trial. Other errors occurring in the trial of the case 
P'reven'ted defendant Jansen from having a fair tria~ 
and the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY &NEBEKER, 
GRAN'T C. A·ADNESEN 
Attorneys for Appel"tamt 
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